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ILLINOIS DOWER AND THE "ILLUSORY"
TRUST: THE NEW YORK INFLUENCE
JOHN CORNELIUS HAYES

HIS article is intended to review, somewhat at large, certain current aspects of the Illinois law of dower; to exiore the implica-

tions of an important recent New York decision relating to the
impact of inter vivos trust transfers upon the statutory marital rights
of a surviving spouse; and to speculate as to whether or not Illinois
lawyers may anticipate that Illinois courts xill continue to follow the
New York lead, even around this latest hairpin turn.
There is, of course, a presumption (rebuttable, one trusts) that most
Chicago lawyers do not know much about dower or about any otier
specialized aspect of real property law, owing to our habit of relying
on the Chicago Title and Trust Company and their staff experts. But
even those Chicago lawyers whose interest in the administration of
estates or in estate planning or in the negotiation of property settlements, incident to actions for divorce or separate maintenance, has
given them proficiency in the law of dowver-even they can be baffled
by the Illinois decisions.
I myself am old enough to have wrestled both as student and as
Wills instructor with the jungle-like legislative improvisations of the
pre-1940 era in Illinois, for the clearance of which the brotherhood
is permanently indebted to the committee which drafted the current
Probate Act. In those years I usually managed to defer to the Property
professor on such matters, but post-war personnel changes finally
added the Real Property sequence to my own subject of Wills, and

I In re Halpern's Estate,

303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951).

MR. HAYES is Professor of Law at Loyola University School of Law, Chicago,
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it then became impossible for me to elude dower any further. Since
then, I have even had the temerity to lecture on dower in the Trust
Development School of the' Illinois Bankers' Association and have
learned a great deal about dower problems from the informal and
exploratory interchange of ideas in these groups.
Put very bluntly, the burden of this article is that statutory marital
rights2 (hereafter called statutory dower or substituted fee dower),
created in Illinois as an optional substitute for our statutorily-retained
common law dower (hereafter called simply common law dower),
are defeasible by several types of inter vivos transfer; that, under the
influence of New York case decisions, the revocable living trust is
such a type of inter vivos transfer as will defeat statutory dower in
Illinois, but the revocable and controllable living trust is not; that,
within the last year, New York has reversed its position in respect to
the ineffectiveness of the revocab!e and controllable living trust to defeat statutory dower, so that such a trust today in New York will
defeat the New York statutory marital rights; and that the same reversal may be anticipated in Illinois.
COMMON LAW DOWER AND

ITS STATUTORY SUBSTITUTE

By way of initiating the discussion, let me recall that dower, as it
existed at the common law, is still optionally in effect in Illinois today
under the provisions of Section 18 of the Illinois Probate Act,3 and that
such common law dower has been extended by the same section to the
surviving husband in lieu of curtesy and has also been extended to
attach to equitable fees. I assume that the new statutory "right to elect
to take [common law] dower" is identical with the right of common
law dower. Common law dower may be defined as a legal life estate
by which a surviving wife (by virtue of a valid marriage and of the
possibility of the birth of issue capable of inheriting the husband's
fees) became seised in her own right (upon the death of the husband
and upon apportionment) of one-third of all fees of which the husband was or became seised (either in fact or in law) at any time during
the continuation of the marriage.' The interest is indefeasible except
2 The award to the surviving spouse and the homestead estate, if any, of the surviving spouse, though aptly described as statutory marital rights, are excluded from the

scope of these remarks.
3 Ill. Rev. Star. (1951) c. 3, § 170.
4 Ibid. The statute merely says, ". . . a third part of all real estate of which the
decedent was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage ...
"
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by (1) the voluntary act of the interest-holder (the surviving spouse)
in releasing or in barring or permitting the bar of the dower; or .by
(2) the prior death of the interest-holder; or by (3) the defeasible
status of the fee itself at the time the dower interest initially attached
to the fee.5 It follows, therefore, that once the interest becomes attached to his fee, the owner-spouse has no available method by which
he can unilaterally defeat common law dower. No type of conveyance by the owner-spouse alone, whether inter vivos or testamentary,
will defeat the interest.
At common law, this dower interest was the sole interest which the
surviving wife had in the realty of the deceased husband; she was
never his heir under any Statute of Descent, and so never inherited
qny share of his realty. On the other hand, while the surviving spouse
had no dower interest in the personalty of the deceased spouse, nevertheless, under the applicable Statute of Distribution, the surviving
spouse was treated as one of the next of kin who succeeded to the
personalty of an intestate decedent. Unlike dower, however, this
statutory marital right of the surviving spouse to an intestate succession to personalty was defeasible by the owner-spouse either by
inter vivos or testamentary transfers of his personalty to third persons,
and the right was also subject to all debts of the owner-spouse. This
statutory marital right of the surviving spouse in the personalty of the
intestate deceased spouse was, therefore, strictly analogous to the mere
expectancy of intestate succession in any of the next of kin.
To elaborate still further the contrast between the common law
dower interest in realty and the statutory marital interest in personalty of an intestate deceased spouse, the former interest may be described as (1) gross, (2) for life, (3) during marriage, whereas the
latter may be described as (1) net, (2) in fee, (3) at death.' By the
contrast of "gross" with "net" is meant that the common law dower
interest was superior to, and took priority over, the debts of the deceased spouse with the important exception of a purchase-money
mortgage, whereas the statutory marital right in the personalty was
subordinate to all debts and expenses. The contrast between "for life"
and "in fee" is self-explanatory; the common law dower interest was
5 Save for the one exception in Illinois in which the dower in a fee simple subject
to executory limitation becomes consummate and assigned before the occurrence of
the executory limitation. Aloe v. Lowe, 278 I11.233, 115 N.E. 862 (1917).
6This expression of the comparison and contrast I first heard in a lecture of Professor Joseph F. Elward, at Loyola University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
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merely a life estate in an undivided one-third of the realty, whereas
the statutory marital right in the personalty was a full fee ownership
of the specified fractional share. By the contrast between "during
marriage" and "at death" is meant that the common law dower attached to every estate of inheritance in realty of which the deceased
spouse was or became seised at any time during the continuation of
the valid marriage, whereas the statutory marital right in the personalty attached solely to such personalty as the deceased spouse owned
at the time of his death. There was, then, a sharp and critical difference between the common law dower in the realty and the statutory
marital rights in the personalty of an intestate deceased spouse; inchoate dower contrasts with a mere expectancy of intestate succession
as sharply as black with white.
The trend of modem legislation in the United States is to expand the
participation of the surviving spouse in the estate of the intestate deceased spouse, with the aim thereby of benefiting the surviving spouse.
Various legislative methods have been employed. New York, for example, in 1930, abolished any future right of common law dower altogether, 7 and replaced it with a statutory marital interest in the realty
of an intestate deceased spouse analogous to the existing statutory marital interest in the personalty of such a spouse, which latter interest was
of course also retained.' Thus, the intestate succession statute now
spells out statutory marital rights in all of the estate of the deceased
spouse. Illinois, on the other hand, chose to retain the common law
dower interest at the sole option of the surviving spouse, who could
elect to take it instead of retaining an automatically provided statutory
marital right in the realty of an intestate deceased spouse strictly analogous to the existing statutory marital right in the personalty of such
a spouse, which latter right was of course also retained. In New York,
therefore, in the case of an intestate deceased spouse, the sole statutory
marital rights of the surviving spouse are mere expectancies of intestate
succession perfectly analogous to the expectancies of heirs and next of
kin generally. The surviving spouse became an heir at the cost of her
lost common law dower, and retained her status as next of kin. In
Illinois, however, in the same case, the surviving spouse may, if she so
elects, take common law dower in each parcel of realty of which the
7

N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 190.
Estate Law (McKinney, 1949) §§ 82, 83.

8 N.Y. Decedent

9 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951)

c. 3, § 162.
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intestate deceased spouse dies seised, instead of retaining the substituted
statutory fee interest therein. And even though the deceased spbuse
was not seised at the time of his death, still, if he had been seised at\ any
time during the continuation of thevalid marriage, the surviving spouse
may also elect to take a common law dower interest instead of enjoying
no interest at all. In each case, however, the election by the surviving
spouse requires an affirmative action within a given time under penalty
otherwise of foregoing the common law dower.'0 In intestate cases,
therefore, tile statutory marital right of the surviving spouse in the net
personalty of the deceased spouse is a mere expectancy of intestate
succession both in New York and in Illinois, and the surviving spouse
has been grouped with the next of kin. Moreover, the statutory marital
right of the surviving spouse in the net realty of the deceased spouse
(which in New York is the sole right of the surviving spouse in the
realty, but which in Illinois is merely a legislatively proffered automatic, but rejectable, substitute for common law dower) is also a mere
expectancy of inheritance both in New York and in Illinois, and the
surviving spouse has been grouped with the heirs.
To conclude these initial observations, one must now attend to the
case in which the deceased spouse dics testate. As already noted, common law dowcr was indefeasible by any devise of the deceased spouse,
but the testamentary transfer of personalty effectively removed such
property from the scope of the Statute of Distribution and hence
avoided and defeated the statutory marital right of the surviving spouse
in the personalty owned at death.
In accord with the modern legislative trend to expand the marital
rights of the surviving spouse for her benefit, the same substituted fee
interest which was provided in intestate cases in lieu of common law
dower (whether optionally or compulsorily) was also made available
in testate cases with certain limitations. It was clear, of course, that this
substituted statutory fee interest in the realty was being awarded to the
surviving spouse at the expense of someone else and without any concurrence by the deceased spouse. In the intestate cases, it was awarded
at the expense of the other heirs simply by including the spouse among
their number; and now, in the testate cases, it was awarded at the expense of the devisees by allowing the spouse to siphon off a forced
share. Moreover, the testate deceased spouse lost his former power to
defeat the statutory marital right of the surviving spouse in his person10 111.Rcv. Stat. (1951) c. 3, § 171.

0
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alty, which power he had enjoyed by the simple expedient of dying
testate as to such personalty; now, however, the statute which provided
the substituted fee interest in the testate realty routinely added a provision for a forced share of the testate personalty as well. Thus, the
statutory marital right to a substituted fee dower in testate cases provided a fee share of both realty and personalty which the deceased
spouse owned at the time of his death."a
In order to claim this statutory substituted share in the testate estate,
it was necessary for the surviving spouse to renounce the will in its
entirety, including any and all provisions making testamentary gifts
to the renouncer. The doctrine of election had not originally been
applied to the surviving spouse in the absence of an express testamentary provision that the testamentary gift was in lieu of dower, but
statutes then routinely reversed that situation so that the doctrine of
election, as between the testamentary gift and the common law dower,
applied unless a testamentary provision directed that the testamentary
gift was in addition to dower. 2 By extension of that position, in order
to obtain the very generous statutory substituted interest, complete
renunciation of the will was customarily required. 13 Naturally, if the
will proved even more generous than the statutory substitute, the surviving spouse would accept the testamentary provisions and such acceptance would preclude any further claim to the statutory substituted
interest. In some states (for example, New York)," the power of the
surviving spouse to renounce was limited. In Illinois, however, Section 20 of the Probate Act provides that any will bars dower in all
realty of the testator unless the will itself expressly directs otherwise
or unless the will is renounced by the surviving spouse in the manner
prescribed in Section 17; hence, a surviving spouse has an unlimited
power of renunciation in Illinois. 5 If the will is effectively renounced
by the surviving spouse, the renouncer's forced share, spelled out in
Section 16, includes a fraction of the net personalty owned at death
and also provides the familiar statutory fee interest in every parcel of
realty owned by the testator at death, subject to a further option to
elect to take common law dower instead in any parcel of realty of
11 See, for example, 111.Rev. Star. (1951) c. 3, § 168; N.Y. Decedent Estate Law
(McKinney, 1949) § 18.
12 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 3, § 172.
13

Note 11 supra.
14 N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1949) § 18.
15

Note 12 supra.
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which the testator was seised at any time during the marriage.' 6 The
renouncer's forced share, therefore, both in New York and in Illinois, normally consists of a fee interest in both personalty and realty
owned by the testator at the time of his death.
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND:

RECENT ILLINOIS DOWER DECISIONS

It seems convenient here to notice two or three ancillary points
relative to Illinois dower:
(A) By rather elaborate textual amendments adopted in 1951, the
choice afforded to the surviving spouse, in respect of each parcel of
realty of which the deceased spouse died seised, operates by way of a
power in the surviving spouse to elect to take a common law dower
interest in such parcel instead of retaining the substitured statutory
fee interest which is automatically conferred upon the surviving
spouse by the operation of Section 11 in the instance of an intestate
decedent and by the operation of Section 16 in the instance of a testate
decedent whose will the surviving spouse has chosen to renounce. This
power seems in the nature of an executory or conditional limitation
upon the statutory fee interest of the surviving spouse, so that the heirs
or devisees, as the case may be, would have an executory interest in
the realty during the limited period of time within which the power
to elect to take the common law dower is exercisable. It seems clear
that this resolution of the respective estates of the parties represents
the original intent of the drafters of the Probate Act in Section 11.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Bruce v. McCornick,7 decided that such intent was not effectively expressed in Section 11, as
then worded. Thus arose the necessity for the recent textual amendments.
I see no reason to attempt any distinction in this respect between
Sections 11 and 16; therefore, I assume that the extension of the holding in the Bruce case would have produced a similar holding under
Section 16, requiring the similar careful amendment to that section.
Nor do I see any reason to doubt that the amended language satisfactorily expresses a practical scheme of estates in the realty of a deceased spouse and will be effective to secure the desired overruling of
the doctrine of the Bruce decision. It has been suggested that "the right
to elect to take dower" may turn out to be a new statutory interest distinguishable from common law dower, in which event its legal charac16 Note 11 supra.
17 396 111. 482, 72 N.E. 2d 333 (1947).
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teristics would remain to be hammered out in future decisions or enactments; I think the suggestion is groundless and merely demonstrates
that the occasional obtuseness of the Illinois Supreme Court (generally understandable, I think, by attending to the equities of the particular fact situation) has some of the brotherhood looking under the
bed.
(B) Both the election to renounce the will of the deceased spouse
and the election to take common law dower in any parcel of realty
of which the deceased spouse died seised require affirmative action by
the surviving spouse in a prescribed manner and within a prescribed
time.' 8
(C) There are routine situations in which the usual options do not
exist in the surviving spouse. If, for example, the deceased spouse was
seised in fee of lot 6 during his lifetime and conveyed the lot to another
without the joinder or release of the surviving spouse, then, upon the
death of the deceased spouse (whether testate or intestate), the surviving spouse does not enjoy a choice between a common law dower
interest and a substituted statutory fee interest. The surviving spouse
has merely the choice as to whether she will or will not elect to take
the common law dower interest, which is the sole interest available
to her by reason of the fact that the deceased spouse did not die seised
of the lot. While it is not possible, therefore, for the deceased spouse
to defeat the common law dower of the surviving spouse by the unilateral inter vivos conveyance, such a conveyance will defeat her statutory marital right to a substituted fee interest in that lot.
Again, suppose that the deceased spouse during his lifetime is vested
merely with a future interest in fee in lot 6, viz., a vested remainder
or an inherited reversion. When the deceased spouse dies, he is not,
and by hypothesis never has been, seised of lot 6. In that event, the
surviving spouse has no choice between common law dower and a
substituted statutory fee interest because there can be no common law
dower in a future interest due to a lack of seisin thereof. The great
contribution of Barker v. Walker 9 to Illinois dower jurisprudence
is that, under Section 11 of the Probate Act, a surviving spouse who
neither has, nor can have, a common law dower interest nevertheless
may and does have the substituted statutory fee interest in a vested
future interest owned by the deceased spouse at the time of his death.
18Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951)

c. 3, §§ 169, 171.

19 403 111.
302, 85 N.E. 2d 748 (1949), noted in 38 Ill. Bar J. 150 (1949).
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I see no reason to suppose that the same holding will not be made
in the appropriate case under Section 16.
(D) The Illinois Supreme Court2 0 has recently had occasion to
resolve a problem which has plagued many states which provide a
renouncer's share to the surviving spouse of a testate decedent. 2' The
problem is how to amass the renouncer's share-from which testamentary donee or donees shall property be taken in order to marshal
the share? In the case of legacies, Section 50 of the Probate Act 22 directs that the distortional impact of the renunciation on legacies shall
be equalized proportionately, but the section sheds no light on the
matter of creating the original distortion by taking from some legatees
rather than from others, except that it assumes that such a distortion
may occur and is to be equalized somehow when it does occur. In a
case construing the forerunner of Section 50, however, the Illinois
Supreme Court thought that the legislature, in speaking of distortion
of legacies, must have had in mind the distortion caused by the application of the normal order of abatement among legacies and so, by
indirection, had provided that the renouncer's share of the net personalty was to be amassed by abating first any intestate personalty, next
any residuary personalty, next any general legacies, and finally any
specific and demonstrative legacies.2 Reflection will disclose that the
amassing of the renouncer's share of the net personalty could "increase" legacies in value only relatively or only by following the doctrine under which the subject matter of a renounced legacy, originally
given to the surviving spouse, falls into the residuary clause of the
will. Section 50 authorizes and directs the court not to permit this latter
result, but to use such subject matter equally to bind up the wounds
of the injured testamentary donees.
The issue in the recent case of Gowling v. Gowling24 was how to
amass the renouncer's substituted fee share in the realty of the testator.
The court followed the literal language of Section 16 in holding that
the share must come from each parcel of devised realty, and that such
a legislative scheme itself equalized the loss incurred by the respective
devisees, so that no further equalization was called for in the sense of
20

Gowling v. Gowling, 405 Ill. 165, 90 N.E. 2d 188 (1950).

21 See, for example, In re Byrne's Estate, 149 N.Y. Misc. 449, 267 N.Y. Supp.
627 (Surr. Ct., 1933).
22111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 3, § 202.
23 Lewis v. Sedgwick, 223 Ill. 213, 79 N.E. 14 (1906).
24405 Ill.
165, 90 N.E. 2d 188 (1950), noted in 39 Il. Bar. J. 200 (1950).
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shifting the incidence of the burden from specific devisees to residuary
devisees by requiring the residuary devisees to make whole the specific devisees. While Section 50 has no application to devisees, an
equitable power of sequestration exists in respect of the subject matter
of any renounced devise to prevent its intestate devolution or its
plunge into the residuary clause, and to use it instead to redress the
losses of the other devisees.
DEVICES TO DEFEAT STATUTORY MARITAL RIGHTS

We turn now to survey the devices available to defeat the statutory
marital rights of a surviving spouse. Common law dower, as noted, is
indefeasible by any unilateral act of the deceased spouse, whether inter
vivos or testamentary. But the statutory substituted fee interest in the
realty of the deceased spouse and the statutory marital right to a fee
interest in the personalty of the deceased spouse, whether he dies testate or intestate, attaches solely to the realty and personalty which he
owned at the time of his death. That being so, logic would suggest that
such fee interests of the surviving spouse can be defeated by the simple expedient of arranging not to own the property at one's death
through the transfer of the property in one's lifetime as a gift inter
vivos, whether outright or in trust. Should this logic full) prevail, a
statutory arrangement designed for the greater benefit of the surviving
spouse, by increasing her share in the estate of the deceased spouse,
could be, at the least, frustrated in those states in which the statutory
fee interest was optional, and, at the most, completely destructive of
all rights of the surviving spouse in those states in which the statutory
fee interest had entirely replaced common law dower'.
Such logic did prevail in the case of the outright gift inter vivos.25
Common law dower, of course, was confined solely to realty and there
was no analogous inchoate right in personalty. There was, therefore,
no restriction upon the right of an owner-spouse, without the concurrence of the surviving spouse, unilaterally to transfer his personalty by way of outright gift inter vivos. The right to succeed to\the
personalty of a decedent was a legislatively granted privilege, extended
solely to the next of kin; and their expectancy of succession was no
bar to complete freedom of inter vivos transfer. When, under the
Statute of Distribution, the surviving spouse was treated as one of
25 The Illinois cases bearing on the devices about to be discussed will be found
infra. For the collected cases bearing bn all these devices, consult 157 A.L.R. 1184
(1945); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); 64 A.L.R. 466 (1929).
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the next of kin and permitted, like them, to enjoy an expectancy of
succession, the new statutory marital right was nothing more than
such an expectancy. It was not an inchoate right nor an extension of
common law dower into the field of intestate personalty. That this
right could, therefore, like any expectancy (but unlike common law
dower), be defeated by an outright gift inter vivos was no surprise.
Like any expectancy, however, it could not be defeated by a gift
inter vivos which for some reason was not a real gift: if, for example,
the deceased spouse had had no bona fide donative intent (i.e., no real
intent presently to divest himself of his title); or if he had made no
effective delivery; or if the gift inter vivos was revocable; or if, though
real and present and irrevocable, it was made upon an agreement by
the donee to retransfer to, or to hold for or subject to the control and
direction of, the donor in furtherance of a scheme to defeat the expectancy of succession, then, either there was no gift inter vivos at all
or the tainted transfer inter vivos could be set aside by the victims of
the scheme. But the mere intent to defeat the expectancies of succession would not of itself constitute any fraud upon the next of kin if
the gift inter vivos, made to accomplish that purpose, was real and
was not accompanied by any collateral condition or agreement by
which the donor retained control of the personalty. The motive was
immaterial if the means used were otherwise unobjectionable because
"there can be no fraud where no right of any person is invaded."2
The same result was obtained for the substituted statutory marital
right of the surviving spouse in the realty of an intestate deceased
spouse. The status as surviving spouse did not convert her substituted
fee interest into an inchoate interest analogous to common law dower;
her interest remained a mere expectancy like that of the heirs, and
equally defeasible by a real gift inter vivos, even when the sole and
explicit motive for such a gift was the defeat of the said marital interest. Nor was the statutory marital interest, spelled out in the renouncer's share of a testate estate, any different, even though it was
granted in a statutory provision which might be judged more closely
analogous to common law dower.
The same result defeating the statutory marital right of a surviving
spouse in personalty was produced by a gift inter vivos made through
the medium of an irrevocable living trust of personalty. The mere
fact that the inter vivos transfer in trust was made solely to defeat the
20Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 I1. App. 393, 26 NE. 2d 736 (1940).

1
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statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse in the trust res was still
an irrelevant factor, and the donor-settlor was even permitted to make
himself the life beneficiary of the trust and, thus, retain the benefit of
the trust res, though not its control. The reservation of the equitable
life estate in the donor-settlor meant that the real subject matter of the
gift was merely the equitable reversion in the res; such an arrangement
worked no distortion of the trust and could be equally well applied
to an outright gift inter vivos which reserved a life estate in the subject
matter.
The fear of disaster to the surviving spouse through the ability of
the deceased spouse to defeat the former's statutory marital rights by
a real gift inter vivos, whether outright or in trust, though logical
enough, might well be largely academic if experience demonstrated
that men found the price of defeating such marital rights too high,
that is, if the 1oit of the inter vivos transfer was too severe. The surviving spouse's statutory marital rights in personalty had always been
subject to this very threat of defeasance, but no unusual recourse to
such a device would appear to have been made, and in practice the
surviving spouse had not suffered. W¥hen, however, modern legislation
added a statutory marital fee interest in realty, then, especially in states
where such statutory interests entirely replaced common law dower,
the inspiration to impose a more damaging defeat on the surviving
spouse was enhanced and the game became more often worth the
candle, especially in the strong play of emotion between spouses
whom disenchantment had affected.
More important than any other factor, however, in the growing
temptation to defeat the surviving spouse, was the remarkable ingenuity of lawyers in inventing devices by which one might give and
yet retain. Such devices removed all the sting from the formerly stern
remedy: the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse could be
frustrated without any appreciable cost or discomfiture. Such a device and engine of defeasance was the revocable living trust in which
the life income was also reserved to the settlor, without any further
reserved control, however, over the res, which was genuinely transferred to an uncontrolled trustee. The reserved power to revoke the
trust in whole or in part (plus the subsidiary powers to alter and amend
the trust) does not conflict with the reality and genuine character of
the trust under the law of trusts, as such a power would conflict with
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13

the reality of an outright gift inter vivos under the common law of
gifts. As a result, the device worked to defeat the statutory marital
27
rights of the surviving spouse, except in Ohio.
It is interesting to note that, while the power to revoke is irreconcilable with the common law theory of an outright gift inter vivos
(except the gift of an engagement ring and of certain choses in action),
the power to revoke is an essential element of the gift causa mortis.
One would expect, perhaps, that the utility of the gift causa mortis
to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse would be
as great as the utility of the revocable living trust. Yet, such is not the
case in the majority of states. 28 It is believed that the principal reasons
for the ineffectiveness of the gift causa morris to defeat the surviving
spouse are to be found in the historical development of the true nature
of the gift causa mortis, particularly in respect to the time when the
transfer of title occurred, and in the intimate relationship of this species of gift to the death of the donor. Today, all agree that the title
is presently transferred upon delivery, but it was formerly thought
that the title was transferred only upon the death of the donor. In
other words, under the modem doctrine, the death of the donor is a
condition subsequent to the transfer of title, whereas, in older days,
it was regarded as a condition precedent to the transfer of title. Under
the older view, the transfer obviously came too late to defeat either
creditors or the surviving spouse. Under the modern view, that objection is no longer true, and the situation should be equated to that of
the revocable living trust. That such has not happened seems to be
due to the factor of imminent death, by reason of which the transfer
is still regarded as quasi-testamentary. Similarly, even an outright gift
inter vivos, if in fact made in contemplation of imminent death or just
before death and with the motive to defeat the statutory marital rights
of the surviving spouse in the subject matter of the gift, will not accomplish the donor's purpose because the donor will be regarded as
having retained control of the subject matter too long. Illinois agrees,
if one adds the further qualification that the subject matter of the gift
constitutes the bulk of the donor's estate; 29 if, however, it does not,
and the donor retains sufficient property to take adequate care of the
27 Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947); Bolles v. Toledo
Trust Co., 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944).
28 Note 25 supra.
29

Blankenship v. Hall, 233

M.

116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908).
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surviving spouse, the gift is effective to block the marital rights of
30
such a spouse in the subject matter of the gift.
To use another approach, the primdry test of the efficacy of the
inter vivos transfer to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse was its reality, its genuinity. If the inter vivos transfer
was real and operated presently to divest the donor of his title, the
transfer was effective to defeat the surviving spouse's statutory interest. The donor's reservation of a life estate in the subject matter of the
inter vivos transfer was a troublesome modification, but that concept
was familiar both in the law of trusts and in the law of property
(although the recognition of the reality of future interests in personalty was slow to develop). One simply examined the reality of the
inter vivos transfer of the future interest, whether outright or in trust.
The troublesome factor lay in the ability of the owner-spouse to
retain the use and enjoyment of the subject matter until he died, i.e.,
to retain to the end so appreciable a measure of control over the subject matter and yet defeat the statutory interest of the surviving
spouse. 3 Legally, however, the retained control which was involved
in the reservation of a life estate was minor compared to the final
present transfer of the future interest in fee.
On the other hand, even when the present use and enjoyment of
the subject matter was transferred to the donee rather than retained
by the donor, the law would consider a reserved power of revocation
a far greater measure of control. Hence, even though the accepted
underlying theory of the gift causa mortis eventually proved to be
a transfer of title in the lifetime of the donor and not merely at his
death, still the existence of the power of revocation in the donor as a
condition subsequent to the inter vivos transfer of the title constituted
such a major retention of control by the owner-spouse that the gift
causa mortis, despite its reality, was not effective to defeat the statu32
tory marital rights of the surviving spouse in the majority of states.
The same consideration underlies the identical holding in many states
in respect to the gift inter vivos made just before, and in contemplation
of, imminent death: the full control over the subject matter of the gift
had been retained by the owner-spouse too long to pernit even a real
30Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 111.App. 635 (1912).
31 Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 Il. 475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921).
32

Note 25 supra.
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and irrevocable transfer on the threshold of death to defeat the statutory marital interest of the surviving spouse. The initial focus was
upon the reality of the inter vivos transfer; but even reality was not
enough where reality did not involve the loss of substantial control
by the donor-spouse. From this point of view, the normal holding that
the revocable living trust is effective to defeat the statutory marital,
rights of the surviving spouse is a remarkable holding, and the Ohio
minority view seems much more in accord with the underlying general principles. Under the law of trusts, the revocable living trust is
of course a reality, presently creating property rights in the trustee
and the beneficiary and presently divesting the donor-settlor of his
property rights in the trust res. But reality alone had not been sufficient to defeat the surviving spouse where the deceased spouse had
retained control over the subject matter of the intt:r vivos transfer,
and the retention of the power to revoke the living rrust is certainly
a plenary measure of control.
In the cases involving the revocable living trust, however, the initial
focus on reality seemed to become the ultimate focus :,s well, perhaps
because the trust res was almost invariably personalty. When to the
power of revocation the settlor added the reservation of the life interest, the trust was still real and its reality still made it effective to defeat
the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse in the trust res.
Moreover, when to the power of revocation and the reservation of the
life interest, the settlor also added the designation of hiself as a cotrustee along with an independent trustee (usually a corporation),
to which the present delivery of the res was made by the settlor, still
the trust was real and its reality continued to make it effective to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse. Even where
the settlor went still further and designated himself the sole trustee
under a well-defined trust instrument which controlled his conduct
as trustee and removed his power to deal with the trust res as he
wished, the trust was still real and, therefore, effective as against the
surviving spouse. 3
Ultimately, however, lawyers drew too fine a line of distinction
when they invented the "controllable" revocable living trust, in which
the settlor reserves, in addition to the power to revoke (and the subsidiary powers to alter and to amend), the power to control the trustee or the co-trustee in the management of the trust res to a substan33

Note 25 supra.
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tial degree. Such a trust, although a reality under the law of trusts, 34

was finally held ineffective to defeat the statutory marital rights of the
surviving spouse in the celebrated New York case of Newman v.
Dore;35 in that respect at least, the trust was "illusory" and not real.
The statement that such a trust was held to be real under the law
of trusts is made deliberately, but with a lingering uncertainty. I studied
this case as a law student in the year in which it was handed down.
In the following years, I studied it again and again as an instructor in
Wills. From the first, my problem lay in deciding whether the court
had held that there was no real trust at all or that, though there was a
real trust, even a real trust in which the settlor retained so high a degree of control over the res was ineffective to defeat the statutory
marital rights of the surviving spouse. I have raised this issue each year
as the class encounters the Newman case and I am still doubtful as to
the correct answer. But I think it is incontestable that, correctly or
incorrectly, the case was accepted as holding that there was a real trust
but that it could not defeat the statutory marital -rightof the surviving
spouse despite its reality because a retention of control in the settlor
brought the inter vivos transfer, insofar as the surviving spouse was
concerned, too close to a testamentary transfer, which the statute made
ineffective to defeat the surviving spouse.
I realize that the inter vivos trust transfer was made three days before
the settlor's death and that the trust res constituted the entire estate
of the settlor. These facts may account for the result favorable to the
surviving spouse, but they do not militate against the reality of the
trust transfer nor are they considered to be essential to the favorable
result for the surviving spouse, as they would be under Illinois law,3"

for example, had the transfer been by outright gift inter vivos.
I realize also that there was a finding that this trust transfer was
made for the sole purpose of defeating the statutory marital right of
the surviving spouse; but this purpose or motive was clearly held immaterial to the resolution of the issue because such a purpose is not
in itself a fraud on those rights (as it is under statute or case decision
in minority states,3

and as it may even have been in New York prior

to the Newman case38). It is also clear that the statutory marital rights
34 See, for example, National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457,
53 N.E. 2d 113 (1944).
35 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
37 Note 25 supra.
36 Notes 29 and 30 supra.
38 Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N.Y. Supp. 814 (1st Dep't, 1936).
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of the surviving spouse under New York law are mere expectancies
and are not inchoate rights in any degree.
Prescinding from these incidental matters, recall that the Newman
case was an action by a surviving spouse to invalidate a revocable and
controllable living trust as a testamentary transfer in violation of her
marital right under Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law.
The court stated that the test of the legality of the means here used for
the sole purpose of defeating the statutory marital right was whether
those means were real or illusory. Was there a genuine, real inter vivos
transfer, or was the transfer colorable only? The court, in holding that
it was merely colorable, stated:
We need not now determine whether such a trust is, for any purpose, a
valid present [inter vivos] trust. It has been said that "where the settlor
transfers property in trust and reserves not only * * * a power to revoke and
modify the trust but also such power to control the trustee as to the details of

the administration of the trust .... the disposition so far as it is intended to take
effect after his death is testamentary * * *." (American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 57, sub. 2.) [This section of the Restatement
refers to the situation in which the alleged trustee is actually merely an agent.]
We assume, without deciding, that except for the provisions of section 18 of
the Decedent Estate Law [renouncer's share section] the trust would be valid.
That is enough to render it an unlawful invasion of the expectant interest of
the wife.
Judged by the substance, not by the form, the testator's conveyance is
illusory ....3 9 In this case . . . the settlor never intended to divest himself of his
property.

I say that this case was understood to hold that the trust was real
but nevertheless ineffective. In Malnhattan Company v. Jalowitz,4 °
a 1939 action by a surviving spouse to set aside a revocable and controllable living trust in which the life income had been reserved to the
settlor-spouse, a New York Surrogate Court entered judgment for the
plaintiff-spouse to set aside the trust to the extent to which it affected
her present statutory rights under Section 18 at the death of the ownerspouse. The opinion well demonstrates the sense in which the lower
New York courts understood the Newman decision, because the court
expressly remarked that there was no substantial difference between
the cases. It stated that the alleged inter vivos trust established by the
deceased spouse could be regarded, as to the surviving spouse under
Sections 18 or 83, as in one of three general categories: (1) irrevocable
39 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 380, 9 N.'. 2d 960, 969

(1937)

(brackets addcd).

40 172 N.Y. Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 375 (Surr. Ct., 1939), modified on other
grounds 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 232 (2d 1)cp't, 1940).
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(which would involve the defeat of the surviving spouse); or (2)
no trust at all (which would involve the victory of the surviving
spouse); or (3) ". . . there may be a situation where a trust is created,
generally lawful, but under which the reserved control of the donor
is so great as to render it illusory or unreal as against a surviving widow
whose rights are thereby prejudiced. Such a trust would be valid as to
all parties except the widow and as to her it is invalid only to the extent that she is prejudiced thereby. Such a trust comes within the rule
that while 'from the technical point of view such a conveyance does
not quite take all that it gives, but practically it does,' which is enough
to render it an unlawful invasion of the expectant interests of the
wife. ' 41 The court added that such a trust might be set aside only by
the surviving spouse and then only to the extent to which it affected
her present existing rights.
The most extreme fom of revocable and controllable inter vivos
trusts is the "Totten" trust (a tentative trust or savings account trust),
defined as follows in the case from which it derives its name:
A savings bank trust is a deposit by one person of his own money in his
own name as trustee for another. Such a deposit, standing alone, does not
establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the
gift in his lifetime by sonic unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of
the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the
beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or declaration of distrust was created as to the
affirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute
42
balance on hand at the death of the depositor.

XIVhatever holding was made in Newman v. Dore4" in respect to the
statutory marital right of the surviving spouse under Section 18, as
affected by a revocable and controllable living trust, would logically

have to apply a fortiori to Totten trusts (even though, prior to the
Newman case, Totten trusts had been held invulnerable to the rights
of the surviving spouse 44). This logical application was actually made
four years later in Krause v. Krause.45 This case, which reaffirmed the
New York recognition of the Totten trust, held that where the de41 Manhattan Company v. Janowitz, 172 N.Y. Misc. 290, 297, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 375,
384 (Surr. Ct., 1939).
42 In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
43 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
44 In re Schurer's Estate, 157 N.Y. Misc. 573, 284 N.Y. Supp. 28 (Surr. Ct.,
1935), aff'd without opinion 248 App. Div. 697, 289 N.Y. Supp. 818 (lstDcp't, 1936).
45285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E. 2d 779 (1941).
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positor died, the form of the deposit alone was sufficient evidence of
the depositor's intent to establish a Totten trust; that the depositor
had during his lifetime neither revoked the trust nor yet completed it
so as to make it irrevocable; and that the balance in the account at the
depositor's death was subject to the statutory marital right of the surviving spouse under Section 18. This case was understood to uphold
the reality of a Totten trust, despite language in the opinion indicating
that there had been no inter vivos gift to the beneficiary, who had no
real interest in the deposit while the depositor lived, so that the trust
was an illusory transfer as to the right of the surviving spouse. The
"reality" test of the Newman case was expressly followed.
That such was the understanding of the Krause case in respect to
the inability of the Totten trust to defeat the statutory marital rights
of the surviving spouse is evident from a concurrent series of New
York cases. These cases sought to differentiate between the surviving
spouse's statutory marital rights under Section 18 (the renouncer's
share of a testate estate) and those rights under Section 83 (the expectancy of succession in an intestate estate) of the New York Decedent Estate Law. The original thought seems to have been that the
statutory right under Section 18 was more closely related to common
law dower than was the mere expectancy under Section 83; hence,
though, under the Newman holding, a revocable and controllable
living trust could not defeat the marital right under Section 18, there
was as yet no holding that such a trust could not defeat the marital
right under Section 83.
In Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank,46 the surviving spouse, as the
administratrix of the deceased spouse, attacked Totten trusts (which
had been neither revoked nor completed in the lifetime of the settlor)
as illusory in respect to her statutory marital rights under the Newman
decision, and demanded that the bank pay the balances to her as administratrix. The lower court held that the Totten trust was directly
analogous to the revocable and controllable living trust in the Newman case, so that, while it was not an illusory trust generally, it was
illusory as to the statutory right of the surviving spouse under Section 18. The court reasoned that a Totten trust, as to the surviving spouse, is equivalent to a testamentary transfer; this transfer,
being in derogation of the statutory marital rights granted under Sec46258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 915 (1st Dep't, 1939).
47
Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 169 N.Y. Misc. 1014, 9 N.Y.S. 2d 227
(S. Ct., 1939).
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tion 18, was forbidden thereby. The New York Appellate Division,
First Department, reversed because the plaintiff-spouse was not claiming under Section 18 but rather under Section 83, which section gave
to a surviving spouse no preferential status but merely grouped her
with all other heirs. 48 Hence, Section 83 conferred no specially protected marital right, but granted merely the same expectancy of intestate succession as was enjoyed by any other heir or next of kin, and
no one had suggested that a Totten trust was illusory as to heirs and
next of kin generally. The Second Department of the Appellate Division disagreed with this decision of the First Department in Schnakenberg v. Schnakenberg," where the spouse of a testate decedent had
no standing under Section 18 because the will had been executed prior
to the statutory critical date. The said spouse attacked a revocable and
controllable living trust established with the intent to defeat her statutory marital rights. The court held that her rights, though under Section 83, were nevertheless entitled to the same protection against the
illusory trust transfers as were the rights under Section 18. In the later
case of Burns v. Turnbull," the Second Department of the Appellate
Division reaffirmed its Scbnakenberg decision, and the Burns case was
then affirmed on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. 5' Thereupon, the First Department of the Appellate Division agreed that the
issue between the Departments had been settled in favor of the Second
Department, and, in a 1946 case, ' 2 held that the rights of the surviving
spouse under Section 83 were to be protected against an illusory trust
transfer. The whole story is skillfully related in the decision of Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank. 3 There, the court, while upholding the
statutory right of the surviving spouse under Section 83 in the face of a
Totten trust, pointed out that the marital right granted by the statute
is not in or to the deposit balance itself, but rather in or to the intestate estate, for which reason an order on the bank to pay the surviving
spouse was erroneous; rather, the order should require the bank to pay
the administrator who will then compute the balance as a part of the
48 Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132,
(1st Dep't, 1939).
49 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (2d Dep't, 1941).
50 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 448 (2d Dep't, 1943).

15 N.Y.S. 2d 915

51 Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E. 2d 785 (1945).
52 Marano v. Lo Carro, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (S. Ct., 1946), aff'd without opinion
270 App. Div. 999, 63 N.Y.S. 2d 829 (1st Dep't, 1946).
53 86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (S. Ct., 1949). See, also, Illusory Transfers in New York, 37
Cornell L. Q. 258 (1951).
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intestate estate and make a proper accounting as between the surviving spouse and the beneficiary.
HOW THESE DEVICES HAVE FARED IN ILLINOIS

What law there is in Illinois today, in this whole area of the effect
of voluntary transfers in trust upon the statutory marital rights under
Sections 11 and 16 of the Illinois Probate Act, is in accord with the
New York law, including specifically the doctrine of Newman v.
Dore. The Illinois cases may be conveniently organized as follows:
(1) The fact that the sole and express purpose of a gratuitous inter
vivos transfer is to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving
spouse is as immaterial in Illinois as it is in New York.5 4 In Haskell v.
Art Institute of Chicago,55 the court stated:
The law is well settled that a husband may dispose absolutely of his
property during his lifetime even though he intended to deprive his wife of
her right to take one-half of such property where she renounces the provisions
of the will. If the gift or disposition of the property, however, is but a scheme
of the husband to deprive the wife of her property rights, at the same time
retaining the benefits of the property himself during his lifetime, the transaction may be set aside. If the title to the paintings passed from the husband to
the Art Institute, then, regardless of what his intentions were, there was no
fraud practiced on the wife. There can be no fraud where no right of any
person is invaded. 56

(2) The primary test in Illinois of the effectiveness of a voluntary
inter vivos transfer to defeat the statutory marital rights of the sur7
viving spouse is the reality of the transfer.
(3) But the reality of the transfer is not always sufficient to accom-

plish the end of defeating the spouse's rights: (a) in Blankenship v.
Hall,"" even though the outright gift inter vivos was real, such gift was
ineffective where it was made just before, and in immediate contemplation of, death and involved the transfer of the bulk of the husband's
property; (b) dicta in three Illinois cases indicate that a gift causa
mortis, though real, would not defeat the surviving spouse in Illinois. 9
54 I-oeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 111.253, 59 N.E. 2d 684 (1945); Padficld v. Padfield,
78 111.16 (1875); Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 I11.App. 393, 26 N.E.
2d 736 (1940).
55 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N.E. 2d 736 (1940).
56 Ibid., at 398 and 739.
57 Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago, 304 I1. App. 393, 26 N.E. 2d 736 (1940).
58233 Il. 116, 84 N.E. 192 (1908).
59 Vest v. Miller, 78 F. 2d 479 (C.A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied 296 U.S. 633 (1935);
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 II1. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944); Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Benton, 171 I11.App. 635 (1912).
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(4) A gift of personal property made by irrevocable living trust
defeats the statutory rights of the surviving spouse, exactly as does an
outright gift inter vivos, 0 even where the settlor-spouse retains a life
income for himself and so makes a beneficial gift of the future interest
only in the trust res.
(5) The reservation by the settlor-spouse of the power to revoke
the living trust (and of the subsidiary powers to alter and amend the
trust) does not make the trust any less a trust, nor does it make the
post-mortem provisions of the trust testamentary in nature, even when
subsequent creditors of the settlor attack the validity of the trust. 1
(6) A combination of a reserved life income and a reserved power
of revocation in the settlor-spouse does not make the trust any the less
62
a valid trust.
(7) The status of the settler-spouse as himself the trustee or a cotrustee does not, of itself, destroy the reality of a living trust. 3
(8) Even a revocable and controllable living trust is nevertheless a
real trust and not illusory or testamentary, and Illinois is traditionally
very liberal in sustaining the reality of revocable and controllable
trusts.64
(9) Although the revocable and controllable living trust is a real
trust, it is nevertheless ineffective to defeat the statutory marital rights
of a surviving spouse under Section 11 of the Probate Act because
65
such a transfer is equivalently testamentary as to the surviving spouse.
No distinction seems to be taken between the rights of the surviving
spouse under Sections 11 and 16; but, even if such a distinction were
to be taken, any decision protecting the right under Section II would
be obliged all the more to protect the right under Section 16.
(10) There is no Illinois case dealing with the reality or legal characteristics of a Totten trust. Generally speaking, there are no Totten
60

West v. Miller, 78 F. 2d 479 (C.A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied 296 U.S. 633 (1935).

61 Gurett v. Mutual Life Insur. Co. of N.Y., 356 III. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934),

aff'g 268 Ill. App. 518 (1932); Farnum v. American National Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago, 305 111.App. 102, 26 N.E. 2d 876 (1940).
62Bergman v. Foreman State Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Il1. App. 408 (1934)

(wherein the attack on the reality of the trust was made by a surviving spouse
on the basis of the contractual right to a fractional share in the estate of the
settlor-spouse).
63
Yokem v. Hicks, 93 1. App. 667 (1900).
64 Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 111.366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker,
181 l1. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899).
65 Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 I11. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944) (this
court cited the Newman case).
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trusts as such in Illinois, since Illinois banks require a trust agreement
to be filed with a trust account or deposit. But Illinois banking practice as to trust savings accounts varies widely, probably because the
very absence of litigation permits a wide spread of opinion and because
a statute protects the banks themselves. ', Some Chicago banks accept
savings bank deposits which are indistinguishable from a Totten trust,
though they are not referred to under that description (e.g., savings
account trust established by parents for their own minor children).
Other Chicago banks accept savings account trusts which are indistinguishable from Totten trusts, but in which the signature card bears
an express trust agreement. In view of the traditionally liberal attitude
of Illinois courts as to what constitutes a real trust, and in view of the
increasing acceptance of Totten trusts in midwestern states,"7 and
in view of the existence in some Chicago banks of trust savings deposits
which are indistinguishable from Totten trusts, it seems highly probable that Illinois, in an appropriate case, will adopt the basic Torten
trust doctrine. Logically, Illinois should then extend the holding in
Smith v. Northern Trust Co. 6 8 to cover such trusts, exactly as the
New York courts extended the Nevnnan holding in the case of Krause
v. Krause,6" unless, by that time, Illinois, still sensitive to the New
York influence, shall have decided to follow New York in abandoning
the Newman doctrine altogether.
THE NEW YORK ABOUT-FACE

A year ago the New York Court of Appeals, in In re Halpern's
Estate,7" changed its mind about the Newman doctrine that, in the
case of a revocable and controllable living trust, reality was not enough
to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse. In a
case involving Totten trusts (the pluperfect example of the revocable
and controllable living trust), the court held instead that reality was
not only a sufficient test but was the sole test of the utility of the
Totten trust to defeat the statutory marital rights of the surviving
spouse under Section 18, even where the trust balances constituted
66111. Rev. Stat. (1951)

c. 16Y, §23.

67 Smallwood v. Boyd, 237 S.W. 2d 66 (Ky., 1951); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344,
231 S.W. 2d 2 (1950); Rickel v. Peck, 211 Minn. 576, 2 N.V. 2d 140 (1942);
Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168 NAY. 353 (1918).
68 Note 65 supra.
69 Note 45 supra.
70 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951).
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about eighty per cent of the estate of the deceased testator. The court
said that the prior New York cases (especially the Newman, Krause,
and Burns decisions) had not held that the trusts there involved were
real as a matter of fact but illusory as a matter of law in respect to the
statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse" instead, they had held
that those particular trusts were not real as a matter of fact, and so,
of course, did not and could not operate to defeat either the statutory
rights of the surviving spouse or the expectancies of the testate or
intestate donees, as the case might be. There is, however, nothing
illusory about a Totten trust as such; unless there is factual evidence
of the absence of an intent by the settlor to divest himself of title, the
Torten trust is not only real and valid, but also completely effective
to vest in the beneficiary the absolute title to the balance in account
at the death of the settlor, even as against the opposing claims of the
surviving spouse under the statutory rights conferred upon her by
Sections 18 or 83. Moreover, there is no power to divide up a valid
trust and to call part of it illusory and part of it good; there is only
one test for the whole trust and that is its reality; and the result of the
application of that test is either the total validity or the total invalidity
of the trust in respect of any and all persons whatever.
A concurring opinion agreed that the Newman case held that the
statutory right of a surviving spouse, under Section 18, could not be
defeated by an illusory revocable and controllable inter vivos trust.
But no case had treated the issue of the extent to which such an
illusory trust should be set aside when attacked by a surviving spouse
on the basis of her statutory rights under Sections 18 or 83; however,
that issue was not decided in this case because this surviving spouse
had no such statutory rights owing to her failure to file a timely
election to take as in intestacy, and owing to the fact that this surviving spouse sued, not in the capacity of a surviving spouse, but in the
capacity of an executrix.
Realizing that Illinois, in the Swuith case, has followed the Neuvlan
doctrine, it behooves the Illinois lawyer to determine how seriously
the Halpern case should be regarded. Should the Halpern case be distinguished from the Newmian, case or should it be accepted literally as
overruling the New-iman doctrine? It would be very easy to distinguish the Halpern case on the ground that the surviving spouse in
that case had no statutory marital rights to assert against the Totten
trust, either because, as the concurring opinion pointed out, no timely
election to renounce the will and to take as in intestacy had been
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made under the provisions of Section 18, or because, as the majority
opinion pointed out, a surviving spouse who is the sole beneficiary
under the will of the deceased spouse cannot elect to take as in intestacy under Section 18. Under either view, the surviving spouse in the
Halpern case, suing in the capacity of executrix, could assert merely
the expectancy of the testamentary donee, which is not analogous, of
course, to the specially protected rights of a surviving spouse.
Would it be safe, however, to rely on this facile distinction of the
Halpern case? The lower New York courts, in the past year, have
cited the Halpern decision in six different cases, three of which are
directly in point. In no case has the lower court attempted to distinguish the Halpern decision and to maintain tile Newman doctrine;
rather, in each case, the court has accepted the Halpern decision as
overruling the Newman doctrine and as establishing that a real revocable and controllable trust may not be regarded as illusory, as a
matter of law, in respect to the statutory marital rights of the surviving
spouse."
The only real doubt which the Halpern case has created is in respect to one's understanding of the basic nature of a real revocable
and controllable trust or a real Totten trust. If, as the Halpern case
insists, the Krause case merely held that the Totten trust there involved was not a real Totten trust at all, one wonders in what respect
it failed to achieve reality. The court suggested that the settlor could
never actually have intended his remote and alien daughter to have
the property; but such a flaw in his intent is hardly self-evident and
could scarcely have escaped notice all these years. Similarly, if, as the
Halpern case insists, the Newman case merely held that the revocable
and controllable living trust there involved was not a real trust at all,
one wonders wherein it lacked reality. I admit, however, that I have
remained doubtful all these years as to the accurate holding of the
Newman case on this very point, and I find it impossible to criticize
the Halpern resolution of that doubt, except to say that the case, during all these years, was not so understood by the New York lower
courts and that the Halpern denial of reality runs counter to the current liberal holdings on that issue. 2 Since the same doubt characterizes
71 See, for example, In re Freistadt's 'Will, 104 N.Y.S. 2d 510 (Surr. Ct., 1951), aff'd
without opinion 278 App. Div. 962, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 995 (2d Dep't, 1951), rev'd on rehearing, after the Halpern decision, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (2d Dep't,
1951).
72 See, for example, National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457,
53 N.E. 2d 113 (1944).
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my understanding of the Smith decision in Illinois, I think it clear that
the Illinois Supreme Court would find it very simple to disavow the
Smith doctrine and to explain that the case merely held that the
revocable and controllable living trust there involved was not a real
trust at all.
These doubts, however, as to the essential elements of such real
trusts do not appear to have seriously disturbed the lower New York
courts in their application of the new Halpern doctrine. Their tacit
assumption is that neither the Totten trust nor the Newman trust has
changed its elemental spots. Such trusts are still what they always
were, neither more nor less real or illusory than ever, when tested by
the same factual standards. But they can no longer fail, as a matter of
law, to defeat the statutory marital rights of a surviving spouse.
WHAT NOW IN ILLINOIS

What, if anything, may one anticipate that Illinois will do, either
by decision or by statute, about the Smith doctrine? The following
speculative straws lead to the conclusion that Illinois would follow
the Halpern doctrine, disavow the Smith doctrine, and distinguish the
Smith case as one merely holding that a particular revocable and
controllable living trust was not real:
(1) The Smith case expressly followed the Newman case, and the
Newman case has been abandoned by its own authors.
(2) The Newman doctrine has also been rejected (whether by
statute or by case decision) in the majority of states which have
treated the issue. The Newman decision today is the minority position; the Halpern decision, which focuses on reality alone and on letting the chips fall where they may, is the currently popular position.
(3) The statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse in Illinois
have been fully equated to mere expectancies, so that the surviving
spouse, under Section 11 or 16 of the Probate Act, is viewed merely
as one of the heirs or next of kin of the deceased spouse, whether
testate or intestate." This concept of the basic nature of the statutory
rights of the surviving spouse makes it difficult to single out the stirviving spouse for a special protected status, and requires that the posi-

tion relative to the survi\.'ing spouse must be the same as the position
relative to any other heir or next of kin. No one has yet suggested that
73 Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Jackson, 412 Ill. 261, 106 N.E. 2d 188 (1952)
[citing Dilhnan v. )illrnan, 409 Il1. 494, 100 N.E. 2d 567 (1951); Bundy v. Solon,
384 Il. 137, 51 N.E. 2d 183 (1943)].
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mere expectancies cannot be defeated by inter vivos transfers of any
kind.
The sole opposing consideration is that, in Illinois, reality alone has
not been sufficient to defeat the statutory rights of the surviving
spouse in the instances of the gift causa mortis and of the gift inter
vivos made just before, and in contemplation of, imminent death, at
least where these gifts transfer the bulk of the estate and are made
with the motive of defeating the surviving spouse.
The weight of the straws, therefore, favors the prediction that Illinois courts will continue to follow New York in its rejection of the
Newman doctrine in favor of the Halpern position. The legislature is
unlikely to intervene in favor of the surviving spouse unless and until
experience may reveal that the defeat of the statutory rights of the
surviving spouse has been facilitated to a degree involving sound public policy. The Halpern decision itself announced the court's regret
that the deceased spouse would resort to a Totten trust transfer to
defeat his surviving spouse; similar legislative regret could be expected
to produce some controlling statutes. Until that time, estate planners
can be reasonably safe in advising the use of the revocable and controllable living trust as the most painless method of defeating the
statutory marital rights of the surviving spouse in Illinois and of restricting her interest to the irreducible minimum of common law
dower in realty.

